The Supreme Court, in a major 6-3 ruling on June 28, 2024, significantly curtailed the power of federal agencies to interpret the laws they administer. The court ruled that courts should rely on their own interpretation of ambiguous laws, rather than deferring to the agencies’ interpretations. This decision is expected to have far-reaching effects across the country, impacting everything from environmental regulation to healthcare costs.
In its 35-page ruling, the court overturned its landmark 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which had given rise to the “Chevron doctrine.” That doctrine had required courts to uphold an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. But in the new ruling, the court, led by Chief Justice John Roberts, rejected the Chevron doctrine as “fundamentally misguided.”
Justice Elena Kagan dissented, warning that the court’s decision would cause a “massive shock to the legal system.” She was joined in her dissent by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson.
When the Chevron decision was first issued over 40 years ago, it was not seen as particularly consequential. But it eventually became one of the most important rulings on federal administrative law, cited by federal courts more than 18,000 times. While the decision was initially welcomed by conservatives, it later became a target for those seeking to limit the power of the administrative state.
The Chevron decision, which upheld the Reagan-era EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act that eased emissions regulations, was initially praised by conservatives. However, the ruling later became a target for those seeking to limit the administrative state’s power. These critics argued that courts, not federal agencies, should determine the meaning of the law.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the idea that agencies are better suited than courts to resolve ambiguities in federal laws. He emphasized that Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions, with the benefit of briefing from the parties and “friends of the court.”
Moreover, Roberts noted that even if courts should not defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, they can still consider that interpretation under the Skidmore deference doctrine.
Finally, Roberts characterized the Chevron doctrine as “unworkable” and not worthy of being upheld under the principle of stare decisis. He argued that it is too difficult to determine whether a statute is truly ambiguous, a key criterion for applying the Chevron framework.